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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
PRESTON ALLEN, suing for himself
and other American Indians similarly
situated,
Plaintiff,

vs.

Case No.

8589
PORTER L. MERRELL, individually
and as County Clerk, Duchesne
County, Utah,
Defendant.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant acknowledges the statement of facts contained in the brief of plaintiff as substantially true and
adopts it for purposes of his argument herein.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
IT IS THE PROVINCE OF THE INDIVIDUAL
STATES TO GRANT OR WITHHOLD THE
ELECTIVE FRANCHISE AND TO FIX THE
QUALIFICATIONS OF VOTERS.
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POINT II
PARAGRAPH (11), SECTION 20-2-14, UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED 1953, IS A REASONABLE
EXERCISE OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWER
TO ESTABLISH VOTING RESIDENCE RE~
QUIREMENTS AND CONTRAVENES NO PROVISION OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
A.

Applicable and Inapplicable Provisions of Federal
Law.

B.

The Basis of the Exclusion is Federal Control and
not Race or Color.

C.

Federal Control of Indians and Their Property.
POINT III

AN ACT OF THE LEGISLATURE IS PRESUMED TO BE CONSTITUTIONAL UNTIL
SHOWN CLEARLY TO BE OTHERWISE, AND
THE BURDEN OF PROOF IS ON THE PARTY
CHALLENGING ITS VALIDITY.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
IT IS THE PROVINCE OF THE INDIVIDUAL
STATES TO GRANT OR WITHHOLD THE
ELECTIVE FRANCHISE AND TO FIX THE
QUALIFICATIONS OF VOTERS.
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It has long been a settled point in our law that it is
the individual states, and not the United States, which grant
the right of suffrage to their citizens. In Minor v. Happersett, 88 U. S. 162 (1875), the United States Supreme Court
held that the State of Missouri had the right to specify
which of its citizens should constitute its electorate, and
that case has since been widely cited and consistently followed. In United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876),
for example, the Supreme Court stated succinctly that "The
right to vote in the states comes from the states; * * *"
and cited the H appersett case by way of authority. To the
same effect is the language of Pope v. Williams, 193 U. S.
621 (1904), at page 632:
"The privilege to vote in any State is not given
by the Federal Constitution, or by any of its amendments. It is not a privilege springing from citizenship
of the United States. Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall.
162. It may not be refused on account of race, color
or previous condition of servitude, but it does not
follow from mere citizenship of the United States.
In other words, the privilege to vote in a State is
within the jurisdiction of the State itself, to be exercised as the State may direct, and upon such terms
as to it may seem proper, provided, of course, no
discrimination is made between individuals in violation of the Federal Constitution."
Reference to further authority on this point seems unnecessary.
Since the state's constitutional or statutory law is the
source of the elective franchise, the state may impose reasonable conditions upon its exercise. State v. Holzmueller,
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5 Atl. 2d 251, 254; People v. Lipsky, 63 N. E. 2d 642, 645.
The state may require as a prerequisite to registration the
payment of a poll tax, Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U. S. 277
(1937), Pirtle v. Brown, 118 Fed. 2d 218, or proof that the
applicant for registration can read and write, Allen v.
Sharp, 184 S. E. 27 (N. C. 1936), Trudeau v. Barnes, 65
Fed. 2d 563 (CA La. 1933), and it may, as expressed by
the Illinois Supreme Court in Clark v. Quick, 36 N. E. 2d
563 ( 1941), impose necessary procedural requirements. At
page 565, the court stated:
"Another preliminary observation will dispose
of considerable argument in the briefs. A great deal
is said on both sides concerning the right of every
voter to express his will at the polls and it is clearly
inferable from the arguments that this is considered
to be an absolute right. It is enough to point out
that it is not an absolute, but a conditional right.
It is conditional, in some cities, upon previous registration; it is conditional upon not moving from one
precinct to another within thirty days; it is conditional upon reaching the polling place while the polls
are open, even though failure to do so might be
entirely without fault on the part of the voter, and
it is conditional in the case of absent voters, on the
proper application being made within the proper
time and in accordance with the statute. The right
to vote is conditional upon many other things which
might be mentioned and upon circumstances which
may or may not appear to be within the control of
the voter. No good purpose can be served by discussing any of the bad results which might follow
from a failure to meet the conditions. No one doubts
the legislative power to prescribe reasonable conditions and any fault which may be found with them
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must be taken up with the legislative rather than
the judicial branch of government."
In Utah, the right to vote is granted by Article IV,
Section 2 of our Constitution. It reads:
"Every citizen of the United States, of the age
of twenty-one years and upwards, who shall have
been a citizen for ninety days, and shall have resided
in the State or Territory one year, in the county
four months, and in the precinct sixty days next
preceding any election, shall be entitled to vote at
such election except as herein otherwise provided."
But this court has made it clear that the right is not absolute, and that the legislature may enact reasonable qualifying provisions which must be complied with before the
right may be exercised. In Evans v. Reiser, 78 U. 253, 2
P. 2d 615 (1931), at 2 P. 2d 624, this court said:

"* * * Thus while a person possessing the
necessary qualifications has a right to vote, such
right is not absolute. The Legislature may prescribe
reasonable rules and regulations which must be complied with before the right becomes absolute. The
right is to be exercised by means of a secret ballot,
or other secret means. In order to carry into effect
the constitutional provision requiring that secrecy in
voting be observed, it is not only competent but it is
the clear duty of the lawmaking power to enact such
laws as will, in its opinion, effect that purpose. So
long as the provisions enacted into law by the Legislature may be said to be reasonable, the plain duty
of the courts is to give such provisions full force
and effect, regardless of what views they may entertain about the wisdom of the law. * * *"
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It remains, then, to examine the effect of paragraph (11),

Section 20-2-14, Utah Code Annotated 1953, to see whether
it is either unreasonable or in violation of some provision
of federal law.
POINT II
PARAGRAPH (11), SECTION 20-2-14, UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED 1953, IS A REASONABLE
EXERCISE OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWER
TO ESTABLISH VOTING RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS AND CONTRAVENES NO PROVISION OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
A.

Applicable and Inapplicable Provisions of Federal
Law.

Plaintiff claims that the statute in question, Section
20-2-14, violates four provisions of the United States Constitution and two provisions of federal law: (1) The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2, (2)
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 14th Amendment, (3) Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment,
(4) The 15th Amendment, and (5) 42 USC 1983 and 42
usc 1971.
Our attention is directed under Point I of the plaintiff's brief to a number of rights that are protected under
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section
2 of the federal constitution, but the right to vote is not one
of them. The reason was explained by the United States
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Supreme Court in Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875)
supra, thusly:

"* * * By article 4, sec. 2, it is provided
that 'The citizens of each State shall be entitled to
all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several States.' If suffrage is necessarily a part of
citizenship, then the citizens of each State must be
entitled to vote in the several States precisely as
their citizens are. This is more than asserting that
they may change their residence and become citizens
of the State and thus be voters. It goes to the extent
of insisting that while retaining their original citizenship they may vote in any State. This, we think,
has never been claimed. * * * "
To the same effect is State v. Kirby, 163 S. W. 2d 990
(Mo. 1942). See also 12 Am. Jur., Con. Law, Section 466.
Nor has the right to vote been considered one of the
privileges and immunities protected by the 14th Amendment. See Minor v. Happersett, supra, Pope v. Williams,
193 U. S. 621, supra, and 12 Am. Jur. Con. Law, Section
466, supra.
In Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536 (1927), the U. S.
Supreme Court made the equal protection clause of the 14th
Amendment the basis for a holding that a negro was entitled to vote in a primary election, but Indians patently
are neither equally protected by state laws, nor equally
responsible under them. They are protected instead by a
host of federal laws, as will be pointed out in more detail,
and it is therefore doubtful that the equal protection clause
has any bearing on the problem before us. 25 USC 349
provides that after the fee patent in allotted lands passes
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to an Indian, he is entitled to equal protection under state
laws, and this seems to suggest that the equal protection
clause is not presently applicable.
It is unnecessary to consider the statutory provisions
plaintiff relies on since they are enacted pursuant to the
constitutional provisions above referred to, and any efficacy
they have is by virtue of said provisions. Further, the constitutional provisions cited are self-executing, as the plaintiff has pointed out in his brief, and therefore reliance upon
such statutory measures seems unnecessary.

We come then to the 15th Amendment, and if there
exists any conflict, it must be with this provision of the
United States Constitution. Unless it abridges the right to
vote on the basis of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude, state action does not offend this amendment.
B.

The Basis of the Exclusion is Federal Control and
not Race or Color.

Plaintiff contends that the defendant has denied him
the right to vote on the basis of race or color, and cites
numerous cases holding this kind of conduct unconstitutional. We agree with the holdings of most of the cited
cases, but they have no application here. There is not the
least foundation for the claim that the plaintiff's action
complained of herein was motivated by considerations of
race or color. On the contrary, the defendant's written
statement, quoted at page 4 of the complaint and page 5
of plaintiff's brief, shows that the basis of the defendant's
action was that the plaintiff "lives on an Indian reservation
and did not establish a residence in any other precinct in
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the State of Utah prior to * * *" his application for
an absentee ballot. This action is in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph (11), Section 20-2-14, U. C. A.
1953, which reads :
"(11) Any person living upon any Indian or
military reservation shall not be deemed a resident
of Utah within the meaning of this chapter, unless
such person had acquired a residence in some county
in Utah prior to taking up his residence upon such
Indian or military reservation."
It is conceded that persons disqualified on the basis of

residence might all happen to belong to a particular race
or be of a particular color, but that argument cannot be
seriously advanced here. It is common knowledge in Utah
that much of the Uintah-Ouray Reservation has been open
to non-Indians for settlement (see brief of plaintiff, pp.
3-4) and that there are today more white persons residing
on the reservation than there are Indians. And there can
be no question that the statute under attack applies by its
terms to white persons equally with Indians.
Additional evidence that the exclusion of the statute is
not one of race or color but of residence, is the context in
which it is found. It is grouped with the rest of the residence provisions, and logically follows that which precedes
it. Further, the reference to "any person living upon any
Indian * * * reservation" is side by side with a similar provision with respect to "any * * * military reservation". When this fact is noted, the question then occurs
whether the plaintiff would not be more consistent to allege
also that the statute discriminates against unmarried en-
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listed men, since they are ordinarily required to live within
the confines of the military post, while officers and enlisted
men with families are usually permitted to take up residence
off the post and thus establish a voting residence. On the
contrary, the plaintiff has found in his brief a basis of
distinction between cases upholding the disfranchisement of
residents of military reservations, but in fact there is no
distinction. The crux of the question in both instances is
federal control, and as will be later shown, the control applies with respect to the territory within the Indian reservation as well as within the military. There are appended
hereto, as Exhibits A and B, copies of two Attorney General's opinions on the voting residence of persons residing
on military reservations in Utah which we believe demonstrate the consistency of the state's application of the statute in question.
The plaintiff, however, finds fault with the opinion of
the Attorney General attached to his brief as Appendix B.
He points out at page 26 of his brief that the opinion mentions no other group or class except Indians and is applied
to Indians alone, thereby discriminating against them. But
he overlooks mentioning that the question was asked with
respect to Indians only, and not to persons in general. The
opinion seems somewhat less discriminatory when this
point is considered.
This raises the question whether the plaintiff has not
become confused in the object of his attack. It is not surprising that he prefers the opinions of Attorneys General
Chez and Giles since they reach a conclusion which permits
the plaintiff and those he represents to vote. But we are
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unable to understand his approval of the method by which
that conclusion was reached. At page 27 of his brief he
sets forth some of the reasoning underlying that opinion
and we agree that it has merit. We would acknowledge
that the statute in question is over half a century in age,
and that great strides have been made in that time toward
lifting the Indians from the benighted state into which
short-sighted federal policy has plunged them. But we
think that legislation on the part of the Attorney General
to accomplish the "modernization" of the statute is indefensible. If the English language is capable of conveying
an idea clearly, it does so in this statute. The words are
"any Indian or military reservation" (emphasis added).
There is nothing in it about "open" or "closed" reservations.
Had the legislature intended such a distinction to exist,
there is every reason to believe it would have said so. No
one will dispute that strong reasons impel us toward granting the vote to those who reside on Indian reservations, but
amendment of statutes is a legislative function.
In truth, when the statute is applied as enacted, there
is no discrimination against the Indians. If the defendant
is permitting some white persons, who are not more qualified than the plaintiff and those in whose behalf he is suing,
to vote since the issuance of the Attorney General's opinion
(plaintiff's brief Appendix B), he might properly be restrained; however, nothing appears from the complaint
herein to show that any white persons permitted by the
defendant to vote had not established voting residences elsewhere in Utah before taking up residence on the reservation.
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C.

Federal Control of Indians and Their Property.

We have pointed out that the reasonableness of the
distinction made in paragraph ( 11) , Section 20-2-14, turns
on the question of federal control. In Herken v. Glynn, 101
P. 2d 946 (Kan. 1940) the court dealt with the question
whether those persons residing on a tract of federal government land set aside for a soldiers' home, were entitled
to vote in Kansas. It concluded they were not so entitled,
and in the course of the opinion stated:
•

"* * * In authorities treating the matter
generally, it is said that where a cession of a tract
is made by a state to the United States for the purposes mentioned in the above constitutional provision, and there is no reservation of jurisdiction by
the state other than the right to serve civil and criminal process on the ceded lands, persons who reside
on such lands do not acquire any electiYe franchise
as inhabitants of the ceding state. See McCrary on
Elections, 4th Ed. § 89, p. 68 ; Paine on Elections, §
63, p. 44 ; Kennan on Residence and Domicile § 493,
p. 844; 20 C. J., Elections, § 33, p. 74; 18 Am. Jur.,
Elections, § 66, p. 224."
Similar holdings on this point are found in State v.
Smith, 103 N. E. 2d 822 (Ohio 1951) and Arledge v. Mabry,
197 P. 2d 884 (N. Mex. 1948). In the latter case the court
found that the involved land was not in New Mexico for
voting residence purposes.
The enabling act admitting Utah to the union is of
some interest at this point. Part of Section 3 reads as follows:
"Second. That the people inhabiting said proposed State do agree that they forever disclaim all
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right and title to the unappropriated public lands
lying within the boundaries thereof; and to all lands
lying within said limits owned or held by any Indian
or Indian tribes ; and that until the title thereto shall
have been extinguished by the United States, the
same shall be and remain subject to the disposition
of the United States, and said Indian lands shall
remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control
of the Congress of the United States; that the lands
belonging to citizens of the United States residing
without the said State shall never be taxed at a
higher rate than the lands belonging to residents
thereof; that no taxes shall be imposed by the State
on lands or property therein belonging to or which
may hereafter be purchased by the United States or
reserved for its use; but nothing herein, or in the
ordinance herein provided for, shall preclude the
said State from taxing, as other lands are taxed, any
lands owned or held by any Indian who has severed
his tribal relations and has obtained from the United
States or from any person a title thereto by patent
or other grant, save and except such lands as have
been or may be granted to any Indian or Indians
under any Act of Congress containing a provision
exempting the lands thus granted from taxation; but
said ordinance shall provide that all such lands shall
be exempt from taxation by said State so long and
to such extent as such Act of Congress may prescribe."
en~:
~n u

,ast

No clearer relinquishment of state control over territory
can be imagined, and except for those portions actually
ceded back to the state or granted in fee to Indians or other
persons the territory within the reservation remains subject
to federal control. Any land granted in fee or returned to
private or state ownership by any means is granted or
returned in accordance with terms fixed by Congress and
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administered by the Secretary of the Interior at their pleasure. It is a fact that title to the land upon which the plaintiff resides is in the United States.
It is suggested in the plaintiff's brief that because of

recent federal legislation granting new privileges to and
removing certain restrictions from many tribes of Indians,
they are pretty much like any other citizens of the State
of Utah. We wish it were so, but a quick reading of Title
25, USCA creates a different impression. Apparently
the U. S. government does not believe the Indians are as
close to the complete independence they so long have deserved as this court is asked to believe. Tribal Indians
plainly are not on the same basis with other residents of the
State in the matters of taxation by the state, subjection
to state criminal laws, control over contractural matters
and control and disposition of real and personal property.
See, for example, 25 USC 465 on the tax status of lands
acquired by the Secretary of Interior for the use of Indians;
Section 412a of the same title on the tax status of Indian
homesteads; Section 349 on the availability of patented
land for the satisfaction of debts incurred prior to the issue
of the patent; Section 371 on the descent of Indian property to children of a marriage "according to the custom
and manner of Indian life" ; Sections 671 and 677 et seq.
(USC Supp. III) on control of contractural relations; 18
USC 1151 and 1154, and Section 3242 on criminal jurisdiction; and 18 USC Sections 1162 and 1360 (Supplement Ill)
on the granting of criminal and civil jurisdiction over
Indians to certain states, but not to Utah.
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It cannot be denied that although progress is being
made toward independence, tribal Indians are still wards
of the government. Congress has established an Indian
claims commission. There is a separate bureau-the Bureau
of Indian Affairs-within the Department of Interior, and
a separate title in the U. S. code for legislation pertaining
especially to Indians.

In plaintiff's brief, considerable reliance is placed on
the decision in Harrison v. Laveen, 196 P. 2d 456 (Ariz.
1948). There was involved in this case a provision of the
Arizona constitution which denied persons under guardianship the right to vote. We are not dealing with such a provision here, and that decision consequently is not dispositive of this case. It is, however, informative with respect to
the status of Indians generally. We quote from page 459:
"It would be idle to contend that tribal Indians
do not still occupy a peculiar and unique relationship
to the federal government. They are, except for a
few civilized tribes, still regarded and treated by the
United States as requiring special consideration and
protection. For nearly a century they were treated
as separate 'nations' and the legal rights of the members were fixed by treaty. Many of these treaties
are still in force and of recognized validity. However, Congress stopped making such treaties in the
year 1871, but since then more than four thousand
distinct statutory enactments have been passed by
the Congress comprising what is commonly referred
to as 'Indian Law'. Many of the Federal enactments
arise from the express grant to Congress found in
article 1, section 8, cl. 3 of the Constitution of the
United States; 'to regulate Commerce * * * with
the Indian Tribes;'. Generally speaking tribal In-
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dians are not subject to State law. The exemption
is particularly true in the fields of criminal law and
taxation."
See also Porter v. Hall, 271 Pac. 411 (Ariz. 1928).
The exclusion resulting from Paragraph (11), Section
20-2-14 is a reasonable one based on federal control over
the persons and property involved, and has no relation to
race or color.
POINT III
AN ACT OF THE LEGISLATURE IS PRESUMED TO BE CONSTITUTIONAL UNTIL
SHOWN CLEARLY TO BE OTHERWISE, AND
THE BURDEN OF PROOF IS ON THE PARTY
CHALLENGING ITS VALIDITY.
There is a presumption of constitutionality in favor
of every statute duly enacted by the legislature. Norville
v. State Tax Commission, 98 U. 170, 97 P. 2d 937 (1940),
Gubler v. Utah State Teachers' Retirement Board, 192 P.
2d 580 (Ut. 1948). In the latter case, the principle was
expressed thus:
"There are certain fundamental principles
which must be taken into consideration by this court
before we strike down an act of the Legislature.
Quoting from Section 39, Black's Handbook of Constitutional Law: 'Every p1~esumption is in favor of
the constitutionality of an act of the legislature.
* * * Every reasonable doubt must be resolved
in favor of the statute, not against it; and the courts
will not adjudge it invalid unless the violation of
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the constitution is, in their judgment, clear, complete, and unmistakable.'"
In view of the presumption, the party asserting invalidity
must clearly show the alleged conflict between the statute
and the constitution, and prove its existence beyond all
doubt. 11 Am. Jur. Con. Law, Section 132. The plaintiff
has failed to sustain that burden in this case. He has argued
that the legislation is out-dated, and we agree that there is
some basis for this view. He has also demonstrated the
need for legislative reform through the policy arguments
he has advanced. But he has failed to show any discrimination against the plaintiff or those similarly situated on the
basis of race or color in violation of the 15th Amendment
to the United States Constitution or any other provision
thereof.

CONCLUSION
The alternative writ should be quashed and the complaint dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER,
Attorney General,
WALTER L. BUDGE,
Assistant Attorney General,
K. ROGER BEAN,
Assistant Attorney General,
Attorneys for Defendant.
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APPENDIX A
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE CAPITOL
SALT LAKE CITY 14, UTAH

56 058

June 1, 1956
Tooele County Commission
REQUESTED BY: Willard H. Sagers, Clerk, Tooele County Commission
OPINION BY:

E. R. Callister, Attorney General
Walter L. Budge, Assistant
Attorney General

QUESTIONS:

1. Is it legal for the Tooele
County Commission to establish a voting district at Dugway Proving Grounds?

2. Is it legal for a person living at Dugway Proving
Grounds to vote at a near-by
voting precinct if a voting district is not established on the
post?
3. A gentleman has lived at
Dugway since coming to America several years ago and is
now a naturalized American
citizen. Where will he be eligible to register and vote?

CONCLUSIONS:

1. No.

2. No, but see opinion.
3. See opinion.
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II

Title 20, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
pertains to registration for elections. Section 14
thereof provides in part as follows:
"For the purpose of registration or voting,
the place of residence of any person must be
governed by the following rules as far as they
are applicable:
1. That place must be considered and held
to be the residence of a person in which his habitation is fixed, and to which, whenever he is
absent, he has the intention of returning.
2. A person must not be held to have
gained or lost a residence by reason of his presence or absence while employed in the service
of the United States or of this state * * *
or while residing upon any * * * military
reservation.

* * * *
5. A person must not be considered to
have gained a residence in any county to which
he comes merely for temporary purposes, without the intention of making such county his
home.

* * * *
9. A change of residence can only be made
by the act of removal, joined with the intent to
remain in another place. A residence cannot be
lost until another is gained.

* * * *
11. Any person living upon any * * *
military reservation shall not be deemed a resiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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III

dent of Utah within the meaning of this chapter unless such person had acquired a residence
in some county in Utah prior to taking up his
residence upon such * * * military reservation.
The Dugway Proving Grounds is a United
States Military Reservation. The situation here is
not analagous to one arising under the Lanham Act,
Public Law No. 849, 76th Congress, 54 Stats. 1125,
for under that act the Congress of the United States
expressly preserved the "civil rights of inhabitants
of such public housing projects", and it has been
held that the "civil rights therein, expressly preserved, included the political right of suffrage".
Johnson vs. Morrill, 126 P. 2d 673, State vs. Corcoran, 128 P. 2d 999. The Lanham Act and the cases
first above cited, had to do with federal lands which
were not upon a military reservation. That fact is
material.
Where the State cedes the realty to the United
States, as is the case at Dugway, and it becomes a
"military reservation", there remains no right to
vote at election precincts established on the realty
prior to the cession. In so holding, we follow the
authority laid down in the case of H erken vs. Glynn,
101 P. 2d 946, 151 Kan. 855, wherein that court said:
"Residence on the realty in Leavenworth
County, Kansas, whereon the National Home for
Disabled Volunteer Soldiers was established by
the United States after the state ceded the
realty to the United States, had no right to vote
at election precincts established on the realty
prior to the cession ; the right to vote not being
a 'municipal right' so as to persist after cession."
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IV

Jurisdiction over the Dugway Proving Grounds
rests in the United States, and the State of Utah has
retained only its right of process, civil and criminal.
"Where a state cedes to the United States
lands for forts, etc. reserving concurrent jurisdiction to serve state process, civil and criminal,
in the ceded place, such reservation merely operates as a condition of the grant and does not
defeat the exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States over such place * * * "
14 Am. Jur., page 924 35 et seq.
Following the above authorities, we are constrained to here declare that the Tooele County Commissioners cannot legally establish a voting district
at Dugway Proving Grounds on realty ceded to the
United States and under the jurisdiction of the federal government.
Question No. 2 : A person living at Dugway
Proving Grounds would not be eligible to vote at a
near-by voting precinct off the reservation unless
and until he could qualify and be eligible to prescribe
to the oath required by Section 20-2-11, U. C. A.
1953. It would be mandatory that he swear that he
resided in such election district at the time he took
the registration oath. If a person had a right to
vote in the State of Utah and had acquired a residence in some county prior to taking up his residence
on the military reservation, he would not have lost
that residence by reason of his presence on the reservation. See 20-2-14 {2) supra. Such a person would
retain his right to vote at his established residence
in Utah. This resolves your question No. 2.
Question No. 3 : If the gentleman you refer to
lived at Dugway and was naturalized prior to the
cession of those lands to the United States, he would
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

v
be eligible to vote in Tooele County, providing he
met the requirements of Section 20-2-20, supra, and
could under such section transfer to a lawful voting
precinct but he would, of course, have to reside in
the election district in which he desired to vote so
that he could subscribe to the registration oath. If
the gentleman became a naturalized American citizen after the realty at Dugway Proving Grounds
had been ceded to the federal government, he would
not be able to gain a residence for the purpose of
registration or voting while continuing to reside
upon the military reservation, Section 20-2-14 (2),
(9) and (11) supra.
We are not unmindful of the pronouncement of
the Utah Supreme Court which declares that our
election laws seek liberality of interpretation against
disenfranchisement, Clegg vs. Bennion, 247 P. 2d
614, 615, ... Ut. . . . . However, there is absolutely
no ambiguity in the wording of the statutes hereinabove set forth, and it has been, and remains, the
opinion of this office that a person living upon and
within the confines of a military reservation may
not establish a residence for voting purposes unless
such person had previously acquired a voting residence in some county in Utah prior to taking up his
residence thereat.
Enlarging upon our letter addressed to you
under date of August 29, 1954, we do here state that
a person having previously acquired a voting residence in Utah or elsewhere would not, by residing
upon a military reservation, have lost such residence,
and that such a person would and should be able to
vote at his former residence according to the laws of
Utah or of his place of former residence wherever
that might be by absentee ballot or as otherwise by
law provided.
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To be a qualified elector in this state, or as far
as the writer knows, in any other state, a voter must
comply with the election laws and fully meet requirements thereof. It has long been in this nation the
fact that some of the citizens have been disenfranchised by reasa-n of their residence at particular
places, so we are not here dealing with a new or
unique situation. We have reference to the District
of Columbia, (where this was until very recently
the fact), to the Military Reservation at Fort Douglas, and to many other federally controlled lands
and installations throughout the country.
Very truly yours,
E. R. CALLISTER
Attorney General
WLB;jt
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APPENDIX B
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE CAPITOL

14, UTAH
August 31, 1956

SALT LAKE CITY

Mrs. G. F. Burnett
487 East 200 South
Clearfield, Utah
Dear Mrs. Burnett:
In reply to your letter of August 29, 1956, be advised that Section 20-2-14, U. C. A. 1953, paragraph
11, reads as follows:
·
"Any person living upon any Indian or military
reservation shall not be deemed a resident of
Utah within the meaning of this chapter, unless
such person had acquired a residence in some
county in Utah prior to taking up his residence
upon such Indian or military reservation."
Under the foregoing section a person living on a
military reservation cannot vote in the state of Utah
unless they have qualified to vote before moving to
the reservation.
The statutes of our state further require that a person must be a resident of the state for at least one
year before he can register and vote and must have
resided in one certain county for three months prior
to registration.
The only way either one of these matters can be
changed is by having the Legislature change the law.
Very truly yours,
PETER M. LOWE
Deputy Attorney General
PMLjjlt
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